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Abstract Consider the problem of private information retrieval (PIR) over a distributed storage system
where M records are stored across N servers by using an [N,K] MDS code. For simplicity, this problem
is usually referred as the coded PIR problem. In 2016, Banawan and Ulukus designed the first capacity-
achieving coded PIR scheme with sub-packetization KNM and access number MKNM , where capacity
characterizes the minimal download size for retrieving per unit of data, and sub-packetization and access
number are two metrics closely related to implementation complexity. In this paper, we focus on minimizing
the sub-packetization and the access number for linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes. We first
determine the lower bounds on sub-packetization and access number, which are KnM−1 and MKnM−1,
respectively, in the nontrivial cases (i.e. N >K > 1 and M > 1), where n=N/gcd(N,K). We then design
a general linear capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme to simultaneously attain these two bounds, implying
tightness of both bounds.
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1 Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR) is a canonical problem in the study of privacy issues that arise from
the retrieval of information from public databases. Specifically, PIR involves a database that contains M
records and a users with query interest θ ∈ {1, ...,M}. The goal is to make the user get retrieves the θth
record without revealing the index θ. In the information theoretic sense, the PIR problem can only be
solved trivially solved by downloading all M records if the database is stored in one server. Therefore, in
FOCS’95 Chor et al. [4,5] developed the distributed formulation for of PIR, where the database is stored
across N servers and the user can communicate with all N servers. The privacy requirement is to ensure
the secrecy of θ against any individual server. Since then, PIR has become a central research topic in the
computer science literature, see [10] for a survey on PIR.
A central issue in PIR is minimizing the communication cost, which is usually measured by the total
number of bits transferred from the user to the servers (i.e. the upload size) and from the servers to
the user (i.e. the download size). In the initial setting of PIR where each record is set to one bit, the
*Corresponding author (email: zfz@amss.ac.cn)
Xu J K, et al. Sci China Inf Sci 2
minimum communication cost achieved is MO(
1
log logM ) [8, 9]. However, in real-world applications, it is
common for the size of each record to be arbitrarily large. Therefore, the upload size is usually negligible
compared to the download size. Consequently, the communication cost can be measured by considering
only the download size. Specifically, define the rate of a PIR scheme as the ratio between the size of
the retrieved record and the download size, and define the capacity as the supremum of the rate over all
PIR schemes. In addition, the reciprocal of the capacity describes the minimum possible download size
per unit of retrieved records. Recently, much work has been done on determining the capacity of PIR in
various cases:
Replication-based PIR: In this case, each of the N servers stores a replication of the database. In [14],
Sun and Jafar proved that the capacity in the non-colluding case is (1 + 1
N
+ · · · + 1
NM−1
)−1. In [15],
they derived the capacity for the colluding case (i.e. ensuring the secrecy of the retrieval index θ against
any subset containing at most T colluding servers for 16T <N) and the robust case (i.e. some servers
may fail to respond). They also determined the capacity of PIR with symmetric privacy in [16], where
symmetric privacy means that the user is required to get no information about the record other than
the θth record. Banawan and Ulukus [2] recently derived the capacity of a multi-message PIR with
replicated non-colluding servers for the case of retrieving more than half records. In [3], they studied the
capacity of PIR with colluding and Byzantine servers. Other studies considered the PIR problem when
some side information is available to the user [7, 13, 20, 22].
Coded PIR: In this case, the database is stored across N servers using some code. In particular, an
[N,K] MDS code is mostly used. Banawan and Ulukus [1] proved that the capacity of the PIR problem
with MDS coded non-colluding servers (i.e. coded PIR) is (1 + K
N
+ · · ·+ K
NM−1
)−1. In [11], the authors
designed a scheme for MDS coded non-colluding servers with rate 1 − K
N
. The capacity of PIR with
symmetric privacy based on MDS coded non-colluding servers was derived in [21]. In [12], the authors
presented a framework for PIR from Reed-Solomon coded colluding servers, and designed a scheme with
the rate 1 − K+T−1
N
. Another PIR scheme for MDS coded colluding servers was later presented in [23]
with the rate (1+ r+ · · ·+ rM−1)−1, where r = 1−
(
N−T
K
)
/
(
N
K
)
. It remains an open problem to determine
the capacity of PIR based on MDS coded colluding servers.
Determining PIR capacity is usually accomplished in two ways: proving an upper bound on the
capacity and designing a general PIR scheme with rate attaining the upper bound. Therefore, these
schemes are called capacity-achieving PIR schemes. Almost all existing capacity-achieving PIR schemes
are implemented by dividing each record into sub-packets (say, L sub-packets) and querying some linear
combinations of the sub-packets from each server. We call L as the sub-packetization of the scheme
and call the total number of sub-packets accessed by all N servers as the access number. Although
large sub-packetization helps to improve the PIR rate, it also increases complexity in implementation
because larger sub-packetization means more combinations, and thus therefore more multiplications are
involved. The problems of reducing sub-packetization and the access-optimal property have been studied
in depth in the literature of minimum storage regenerating codes [18,19]. However, for the PIR problem,
most known capacity-achieving PIR schemes with asymmetric privacy have demonstrate exponential
sub-packetization and access number. For example, the capacity-achieving scheme in [14] exhibits sub-
packetization NM and access number MNM , and the scheme in [1] has sub-packetization KNM and
access number MKNM . On the other hand, a scheme with sub-packetization K(N −K) was designed
in [11] at the sacrifice of failing to achieve the desired of capacity. Theoretically, it is meaningful to
characterize the minimum sub-packetization for achieving capacity in linear PIR schemes.
Our research interest is to minimize both the sub-packetization and the access number for linear
capacity-achieving PIR schemes. For replication-based PIR, the paper [17] first characterized the op-
timal download cost for arbitrary record length and demonstrated that the optimal sub-packetization
for T = 1 is NM−1. One of our recent work [24] extends this result to general T and proves that the
optimal sub-packetization for capacity-achieving PIR schemes over replicated servers is dnM−1, where
d = gcd(N, T ), n = N/d. In this paper, we focus on the sub-packetization and the access number for
linear capacity-achieving PIR schemes over MDS coded non-colluding servers. Our contributions are
three-fold:
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1. A lower bound on the sub-packetization L, i.e., L > KnM−1, where n = N/gcd(N,K).
2. A lower bound on the access number ω, i.e., ω > MKnM−1.
3. A general linear capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme with sub-packetization L = KnM−1 and
access number ω = MKnM−1, which implies that our lower bounds are both tight. In other
words, we design a capacity-achieving PIR scheme that simultaneously achieves the optimal sub-
packetization and the optimal access number.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, a formal description of the coded PIR model and a
brief recall of the proof for capacity are provided in Section 2. Lower bounds on the sub-packetization and
the access number are then presented in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. Finally, a general linear
capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme that simultaneously attains the two lower bounds is presented in
Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations and the PIR model
For positive integers m,n ∈ N with m < n, we denote by [m : n] the set {m,m + 1, ..., n} and denote
by [n] the set {1, 2, ..., n}. For a vector Q = (q1, ..., qn) and any subset Γ = {i1, ..., im} ⊆ [n], let
QΓ = (qi1 , ..., qim). Moreover, to differentiate indices of the servers for records, we use superscripts as
indices of the servers and subscripts for the records. For example, we use Q
(i)
θ to denote the a query to
the ith server when the user wants the θth record. Throughout the paper, we use cursive capital letters
to denote random variables such as W ,Q, etc.
Suppose there are M records denoted by W1, . . . ,WM . Each record consists of L symbols drawn
independently and uniformly from the finite field Fq, i.e.,
∀i ∈ [M ], H(Wi) = L, H(W1, ...,WM ) =
M∑
i=1
H(Wi) =ML. (1)
where H(·) denotes the entropy function with base q.
Moreover, the M records are stored across N servers through an [N,K] MDS code. Therefore, we
further assume L = KL˜ andWj ∈ FK×L˜q for all j ∈ [M ]. Let G = (g1,g2, ...,gN ) ∈ F
K×N
q be a generator
matrix of an [N,K] MDS code over Fq. Then following MDS encoding, the ith server, Serv
(i), 1 6 i 6 N ,
stores C(i) = (C
(i)
1 , ..., C
(i)
M ) where
C
(i)
j = g
τ
iWj ∈ F
1×L˜
q for 1 6 j 6M .
Because of the [N,K] MDS encoding, for any subset Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = K, we have H(CΓ) = ML and
H(W[M ]|C
Γ) = 0, where CΓ = {C(i) | i ∈ Γ}.
A PIR scheme allows a user to retrieve a record, say Wθ, for some θ ∈ [M ] by accessing the N servers
while ensuring the secrecy of the index θ against any individual server. PIR consists of two phases:
• Query phase. Given an index θ ∈ [M ] and some random resources S, the user computes Que(θ,S) =
(Q
(1)
θ , ...,Q
(N)
θ ), and sends Q
(i)
θ to Serv
(i) for 1 6 i 6 N . Note that S and θ are private information
only known to the user, and the function Que(·, ·) is the query function determined by the scheme. For
simplicity, we define the query set Q = {Q
(i)
θ ,S|i ∈ [N ], θ ∈ [M ]}. Then
I(C[N ];Q) = 0, (2)
which implies that the user generates queries without knowledge of the exact content of the coded records.
• Response phase. For 1 6 i 6 N , the ith Serv(i) at receiving Q
(i)
θ , computes Ans
(i)(Q
(i)
θ , C
(i)) =
A
(i)
θ and sends it to the user, where Ans
(i)(·, ·) is Serv(i)’s answer function determined by the scheme.
ObviouslyEvidently,
H(A
(i)
θ |C
(i);Q
(i)
θ ) = 0. (3)
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Moreover, a coded PIR scheme must satisfy the following two conditions:
(1) Correctness:
H(Wθ|A
[N ]
θ ,Q
[N ]
θ ,S) = 0, (4)
which implies that the user can definitely recover the recordWθ after receiving responses from all servers.
Based on the definition of Q, the correctness conditions can also be represented as
H(Wθ|A
[N ]
θ ,Q) = 0. (5)
(2) Privacy: For any i ∈ [N ],
I(θ;Q
(i)
θ ,A
(i)
θ , C
(i)) = 0, (6)
which implies that any individual server gets no information about the index θ. Note that Q
(i)
θ ,A
(i)
θ , C
(i)
is the information held by the Serv(i).
Set D =
∑N
i=1H(A
(i)
θ ), which actually denotes the download size. From the privacy condition, we
have I(θ;A
(i)
θ ) = 0, which implies that D is independent of the index θ. Thus, we can define the rate
and the capacity of PIR schemes as follows.
Definition 1. (PIR Rate and Capacity) The PIR rate R of a PIR scheme is defined as
R =
L
D
=
H(Wθ)∑N
i=1H(A
(i)
θ )
for any θ ∈ [M ].
The capacity CC-PIR is the supremum of R over all PIR schemes.
Definition 2. (Sub-packetization and Access Number) Suppose L = KL˜ and each record is expressed
as a K × L˜ matrix over Fq, i.e., Wj ∈ FK×L˜q for 1 6 j 6 M . Using the notations defined previously, a
coded PIR scheme is called linear if for retrieving any record Wθ, θ ∈ [M ], the answers from each server
are derived as linear combinations of the data stored in that server, i.e., for 1 6 i 6 N ,
A
(i)
θ =
M∑
j=1
C
(i)
j Q
(i)
θ,j ∈ F
γi
q , (7)
where Q
(i)
θ,j is an L˜ × γi matrix over Fq, 1 6 j 6 M . We call L as the sub-packetization of the PIR
scheme. Moreover, we define the access number ω as the maximum number of sub-packets accessed by
all servers for retrieving any record, i.e.,
ω = max
θ∈[M]
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
RN(Q
(i)
θ,j), (8)
where RN(Q
(i)
θ,j) denotes the number of nonzero rows in Q
(i)
θ,j.
2.2 Capacity of coded PIR schemes
Note that the capacity of coded PIR has been determined in [1], i.e., CC-PIR = (1+
K
N
+K
2
N2
+· · ·+K
M−1
NM−1
)−1.
We briefly restate some key lemmas during the derivation of this capacity, which will be used in later
sections. Proofs of the following two lemmas can be found in [1].
Lemma 1. For a coded PIR scheme, for any θ, θ′ ∈ [M ], any subset Λ ⊆ [M ] and i ∈ [N ] ,
H(A
(i)
θ |WΛ,Q) = H(A
(i)
θ′ |WΛ,Q) . (9)
Lemma 2. For a coded PIR scheme, for any θ ∈ [M ], any subset Λ ⊆ [M ] and Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = K,
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q) =
∑
i∈Γ
H(A
(i)
θ |WΛ,Q) . (10)
Note that from (9) and (10) we can immediately determine that for any θ, θ′ ∈ [M ], any subset Λ ⊆ [M ],
and Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = K,
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q) = H(A
Γ
θ′ |WΛ,Q) . (11)
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Lemma 3. For a coded PIR scheme, for any subset Λ ⊆ [M ], for any θ ∈ Λ and any θ′ ∈ [M ]− Λ,
H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q) >
KL
N
+
K
N
H(A
[N ]
θ′ |WΛ,Wθ′ ,Q) .
Proof. Since
H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q) > H(A
Γ
θ |WΛ,Q), (12)
for any Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = K, then
H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q) >
1(
N
K
) ∑
Γ:Γ⊆[N ],|Γ|=K
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q)
(a)
=
1(
N
K
) ∑
Γ:Γ⊆[N ],|Γ|=K
H(AΓθ′ |WΛ,Q)
(b)
>
K
N
H(A
[N ]
θ′ |WΛ,Q)
=
K
N
(
H(A
[N ]
θ′ ,Wθ′ |WΛ,Q)−H(Wθ′ |A
[N ]
θ′ ,WΛ,Q)
)
(c)
=
K
N
(
H(Wθ′ |WΛ,Q) +H(A
[N ]
θ′ |WΛ,Wθ′,Q)
)
(d)
=
KL
N
+
K
N
H(A
[N ]
θ′ |WΛ,Wθ′ ,Q),
where (a) follows from (11), the inequality (b) comes from the Han’s inequality, (c) is due to the fact that
H(Wθ′ |A
[N ]
θ′ ,WΛ,Q) = 0, and (d) comes from the assumptions (1) and (2).
The next theorem characterizes the capacity of [N,K] MDS coded PIR in the non-colluding case (i.e.
T = 1). The theorem has been proved in [1]. Here, we reprove the theorem to derive some key equalities
for later use.
Theorem 1. For coded PIR with M records and N coded servers, the capacity is
CC-PIR = (1 +
K
N
+
K2
N2
+ · · ·+
KM−1
NM−1
)−1.
Proof. Based on the general capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme presented in [1], it is sufficient to
demonstrate that for all coded PIR schemes, the PIR rate is bounded by R 6 (1+K
N
+K
2
N2
+· · ·+K
M−1
NM−1
)−1.
For any θ ∈ [M ], we prove
H(A
[N ]
θ |Q) >
M−1∑
i=1
Ki
N i
L . (13)
First, we have
L = H(Wθ)
(a)
= H(Wθ|Q)−H(Wθ|A
[N ]
θ ,Q) = H(A
[N ]
θ |Q)−H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ,Q), (14)
where (a) comes from (2) and (5). Then by Lemma 3, H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ,Q) >
KL
N
+ K
N
(H(A
[N ]
θ′ |Wθ,Wθ′,Q).
By recursively using Lemma 3, we have
H(A
[N ]
θ |W1,Q) >
M−1∑
i=1
Ki
N i
L+
KM−1
NM−1
H(A
[N ]
θ′′ |W[M ],Q)
(a)
=
M−1∑
i=1
Ki
N i
L, (15)
where (a) comes from (3). Combining with (14) and (15), we immediately obtain (13).
Finally, for any coded PIR scheme, we know that its rate
R =
H(Wθ)∑N
i=1H(A
(i)
θ )
6
L
H(A
[N ]
θ )
6
L
H(A
[N ]
θ |Q)
. (16)
Combining with (13), R 6 (1 + K
N
+ K
2
N2
+ · · ·+ K
M−1
NM−1
)−1.
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3 The Lower Bound on Sub-Packetization
In this section, we derive a lower bound on the sub-packetization for all linear capacity-achieving coded
PIR schemes. Namely,
Theorem 2. Suppose M > 2, N >K> 1. Then any linear capacity-achieving [N,K] MDS coded PIR
scheme has sub-packetization L > KnM−1 where d = gcd(N,K), n = N/d.
In proving the lower bound, we derive some identities of capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes and
then some properties of linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2,
respectively. Finally, the proof of Theorem 2 is presented in Section 3.3.
3.1 Some identities for capacity-achieving PIR schemes
Lemma 4. Consider capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes. For any θ ∈ [M ], denote θ¯ = [M ]−θ, then
H(A
[N ]
θ |Q) =
N∑
i=1
H(A
(i)
θ ) = D , (17)
H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ,Q) = D − L . (18)
H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ¯,Q) = L . (19)
Proof. From (16) R=L/D6L/H(A
[N ]
θ |Q)6 (1 +
K
N
+ K
2
N2
+ · · ·+ K
M−1
NM−1
)−1 for any coded PIR scheme.
In particular, for every capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme, R = (1+ K
N
+ K
2
N2
+ · · ·+ K
M−1
NM−1
)−1. There-
fore, we have H(A
[N ]
θ |Q) =
∑N
i=1H(A
(i)
θ ) = D for capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes. Combining
with (14) and (17), we further have H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ,Q) = H(A
[N ]
θ |Q) − L = D − L. Finally, by the fact
H(A
[N ]
θ |W[M ],Q) = 0 and H(Wθ|A
[N ]
θ ,Wθ¯,Q) = 0, we have
H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ¯,Q) = I(A
[N ]
θ ;Wθ|Wθ¯,Q) = H(Wθ|Wθ¯,Q) = L.
Lemma 5. Consider capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes. For any θ ∈ [M ], any Λ ⊆ [M ], and any
Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = K,
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q) =
{
H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q), if θ ∈ Λ
K
N
H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q), if θ /∈ Λ
(20)
Proof. For capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes, (12) and (13) both hold with equalities, i.e., for any
θ ∈ Λ,
H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q) = H(A
Γ
θ |WΛ,Q) (21)
while for any θ ∈ Λ, θ′ ∈ [M ]− Λ, H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q) =
K
N
H(A
[N ]
θ′ |WΛ,Q).
Thus we are left to prove the Lemma for the case θ 6∈ Λ. Arbitrarily choose θ′ ∈ Λ, then for any θ 6∈ Λ,
K
N
H(A
[N ]
θ |WΛ,Q) = H(A
[N ]
θ′ |WΛ,Q)
(a)
= H(AΓθ′ |WΛ,Q)
(b)
= H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q),
where (a) come from (21) and (b) come from (11).
3.2 Properties of linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes
We first define a vectorization operator Vec, which maps a matrix A ∈ Fm×n to a row vector Vec(A) ∈ Fmn
whose entries are successively drawn from the matrix row by row. For example, suppose A =
(
1 2 0
2 0 1
)
,
then Vec(A) =
(
1 2 0 2 0 1
)
. The proof of the following proposition is not difficult and so we omit it
here.
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Proposition 1. Suppose A ∈ Fm×s, B ∈ Ft×n, Z ∈ Fs×t, Y ∈ Fm×n and AZB = Y , then Vec(Y ) =
Vec(Z)(Aτ ⊗ B). Moreover, suppose A1, A2 ∈ Fm×n, k1, k2 ∈ F, then Vec(k1A1 + k2A2) = k1Vec(A1) +
k2Vec(A2).
By Proposition 1, we can rewrite the equation (7), i.e, A
(i)
θ = Vec(A
(i)
θ ) =
∑M
j=1 Vec(Wj)(gi ⊗Q
(i)
θ,j).
Equivalently,
(A
(1)
θ , A
(2)
θ , ..., A
(N)
θ ) = (Vec(W1),Vec(W2), ...,Vec(WM )) ·


g1 ⊗Q
(1)
θ,1 g2 ⊗Q
(2)
θ,1 · · · gN ⊗Q
(N)
θ,1
g1 ⊗Q
(1)
θ,2 g2 ⊗Q
(2)
θ,2 · · · gN ⊗Q
(N)
θ,2
...
...
...
...
g1 ⊗Q
(1)
θ,M g2 ⊗Q
(2)
θ,M · · · gN ⊗Q
(N)
θ,M

 . (22)
That is, we formulate of a general linear coded PIR scheme in (22). In particular, we represent each
record as a row vector by using the function Vec, which is convenient for investigating the rank of the
matrix. For any Γ ⊆ [N ],Λ ⊆ [M ], define the sub-matrix Q˜Γθ,Λ = (gi ⊗Q
(i)
θ,j)j∈Λ,i∈Γ.
Next, we establish a connection between the rank of the sub-matrix Q˜Γθ,Λ and some conditional entropy
in Lemma 6. Combining with the identities of the entropy obtained in Section III-A, we can then get some
characterizations of these sub-matrices in Proposition 2, which will be used to prove the lower bound on
sub-packetization in Section III-C.
Lemma 6. Consider linear capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme. For any θ ∈ [M ], and for any
nonempty subsets Γ ⊆ [N ] and Λ ⊆ [M ],
H(AΓθ |WΛ,Q) = rank(Q˜
Γ
θ,[M ]−Λ). (23)
The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 8 in [24] and is omitted here.
Proposition 2. For a linear capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme, for any θ ∈ [M ], then it holds
rank(Q˜
[N ]
θ,θ ) = L . (24)
Moreover, for any Γ ⊆ [N ] with |Γ| = K, it holds
rank(Q˜Γθ,θ) =
KL
N
, (25)
rank(Q˜Γ
θ,θ¯
) = D − L. (26)
Proof. First, it follows from (23) and (19) that rank(Q˜
[N ]
θ,θ ) = H(A
[N ]
θ |Wθ¯,Q) = L. Hence, by Lemma
5, it has rank(Q˜Γθ,θ) =
KL
N
. Similarly, one can obtain rank(Q˜Γ
θ,θ¯
) = rank(Q˜
[N ]
θ,θ¯
) = D − L.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 2
We first present a simple lemma without proof.
Lemma 7. Let a, b,m ∈ N. Suppose d1 = gcd(a, b), d2 = gcd(am,
∑m
i=0 a
m−ibi), then d2 = d
m
1 .
Next we prove Theorem 2.
Proof. The proof is completed in four steps.
(1) Prove L and D have specific forms, that is, L = µ dkgcd(d,nM−1)n
M−1 andD = µ dkgcd(d,nM−1)
∑M−1
i=0 n
M−1−iki
for some µ ∈ N, where d = gcd(N,K), n = N
d
, k = K
d
.
By the definition of linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes, we have
L
D
=
1
1 + k
n
+ k
2
n2
+ · · ·+ k
M−1
nM−1
=
nM−1∑M−1
i=0 n
M−1−iki
. (27)
Since both L and D are integers in linear schemes, then (27) implies nM−1|L
∑M−1
i=0 n
M−1−iki. Note
that gcd(n, k) = 1, and so by Lemma 7 it holds
gcd(nM−1,
M−1∑
i=0
nM−1−iki) = (gcd(n, k))M−1 = 1.
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Since nM−1|L(
∑M−1
i=0 n
M−1−iki), then nM−1 is a factor of L. On the other hand, by the assumption of
L i.e., L = KL˜, which implies that L is a multiple of lcm(K,nM−1). Denote µ = Llcm(K,nM−1) , then
L = µ · lcm(K,nM−1) = µ
dk
gcd(d, nM−1)
nM−1.
Combining with (27),
D = µ
dk
gcd(d, nM−1)
M−1∑
i=0
nM−1−iki.
(2) Prove N | L.
By Lemma 2 and Lemma 6, we have rank(Q˜Γθ,θ) =
∑
i∈Γ rank(Q˜
(i)
θ,θ) for any Γ with |Γ| = K. So for
any i, j ∈ [N ], it holds rank(Q˜
(i)
θ,θ) = rank(Q˜
(j)
θ,θ). Combining with (25), one can obtain rank(Q˜
(i)
θ,θ) =
L
N
,
which implies N |L.
(3) Prove K | D − L.
Similar to the above result, for any i, j ∈ [N ], we have rank(Q˜
(i)
θ,θ¯
) = rank(Q˜
(j)
θ,θ¯
). Combining with (26),
one can obtain rank(Q˜
(i)
θ,θ) =
D−L
K
, which implies K|D − L.
(4) Prove gcd(d, nM−1)|µ.
Finally, from N | L and L = µk dgcd(d,nM−1)n
M−1 we have gcd(d, nM−1) | µknM−2. Similarly, from
K | D − L and D − L = µk dk
gcd(d,nM−1)
∑M−2
i=0 n
M−2−iki we have gcd(d, nM−1) | µk
∑M−2
i=0 n
M−2−iki.
Therefore,
gcd(d, nM−1) | gcd(µknM−2, µk
M−2∑
i=0
nM−2−iki) .
Note that gcd(n, k) = 1, then we know from Lemma 7 that gcd(nM−2,
∑M−2
i=0 n
M−2−iki) = 1, which
implies that gcd(µknM−2, µk
∑M−2
i=0 n
M−2−iki) = µk. On the other hand, gcd(k, gcd(d, nM−1)) =
gcd(k, d, nM−1) = 1. So we have gcd(d, nM−1)|µ and µ > gcd(d, nM−1). Consequently,
L = µk
d
gcd(d, nM−1)
nM−1 > KnM−1 .
4 The Lower Bound on Access Number
In this section, we derive a lower bound on the access number for all linear capacity-achieving coded PIR
schemes. Namely,
Theorem 3. For all linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes withM records stored in N servers by
using an [N,K] MDS code, the access number ω is bounded by ω > MKnM−1, where n = Ngcd(N,K) ,M >
2, N > K.
Proof. Note that in the second part of the proof of Theorem 2, it holds rank(Q
(i)
j,j) =
L
N
for i ∈ [N ], j ∈
[M ]. Combining with (9) and (23), one can obtain rank(Q˜
(i)
θ,j) =
L
N
for i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [M ]. On the other
hand, since |RN(Q
(i)
θ,j)| > rank(Q
(i)
θ,j) and Q˜
(i)
θ,j = gi ⊗Q
(i)
θ,j, then ω >
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1 rank(Q˜
(i)
θ,j) = NM
L
N
=
ML
(a)
> MKnM−1, where (a) follows from Theorem 2.
5 General coded PIR schemes with L = KnM−1 and ω = MKnM−1
In this section, we present a linear capacity-achieving coded PIR scheme with the sub-packetization
L = KnM−1 and the access number ω = MKnM−1 for nontrivial cases, i.e., N > K > 1,M > 1.
To illustrate the main idea, we begin with three examples. The first two examples are for the case
K < N < 2K and the third is for the case N > 2K.
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5.1 Examples
Example 1. Suppose M = 2, N = 3 and K = 2. In this case the sub-packetization of our scheme is
L = KnM−1 = 6, and so each record can be regarded as a 2 × 3 matrix over Fq, i.e., W1,W2 ∈ F2×3q .
Let gi be the ith column of a 2 × 3 generator matrix G of an [3, 2] MDS code over Fq, which is used
for distributed storage. That is, the data stored in Serv(i), 1 6 i 6 3, is gτi (W1,W2). Without loss of
generality, suppose the the user wants W1. The PIR scheme works as follows:
First, let S1, S2 be two matrices privately chosen by the user independently and uniformly from all 3×3
permutation matrices, where a permutation matrix is a binary matrix with only one 1 in each row and
each column. Define (a1, a2, a3) = W1S1, (b1,b2,b3) = W2S2, where ai,bi are 2-dimensional column
vectors for 1 6 i 6 3. Since the ai’s contain information of the desired record W1, we call them desired
columns, while the bi’s and ai + bj ’s are called interference columns and mixed columns, respectively.
However, because of the distributed storage using an [3, 2] MDS code, Serv(i) can provide gτi aj ,g
τ
i bj
for 1 6 j 6 3 in his answers. We display all the answers in the left table in Figure 1. Specifically, these
answers are formed by iteratively applying the following two steps:
(a1) Combining new desired columns with recoverable interference columns.
(a2) Querying new interference columns to enforce record symmetry within each server.
As in the left table in Figure 1, the second line is built based on the first line by using (a2). Thus, the
record symmetry is achieved within each server in the first two lines. For example, Serv(1) provides two
symbols related with each record, while Serv(2) and Serv(3) each provides one symbol related with each
record. After the two lines, one can see that the columns a1, a2,b1,b2 are recoverable from the [3, 2]
MDS encoding. Then, using (a1), the third line of the table is formed.
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
gτ1a1, g
τ
1a2 g
τ
2a1 g
τ
3a2
gτ1b1, g
τ
1b2 g
τ
2b1 g
τ
3b2
gτ2 (a3 + b2) g
τ
3 (a3 + b1)
(a2)
(a1)
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
gτ1a
′
1, g
τ
1a
′
2 g
τ
2a
′
1 g
τ
3a
′
2
gτ1b
′
1, g
τ
1b
′
2 g
τ
2b
′
1 g
τ
3b
′
2
gτ2 (a
′
2 + b
′
3) g
τ
3 (a
′
1 + b
′
3)
Figure 1 Suppose M=2, N=3,K=2. The left table is for privately retrieving W1, while the right is for retrieving W2.
It is clear that the user can recover all the columns a1, a2, a3 from all the answers listed in the table.
By multiplying S−11 the user can then obtain the record W1. Thus, the correctness condition is satisfied.
We then explain why the privacy condition also holds. It is equivalent to show that for any individual
server, its query sequence for retrievingW1 has the same distribution as the query sequence for retrieving
W2. The answers for retrieving W2 are listed in the right table in Figure 1, where the columns a
′
i,b
′
i are
defined as (a′1, a
′
2, a
′
3) =W1S
′
1, (b
′
1,b
′
2,b
′
3) =W2S
′
2. and the matrices S
′
1 and S
′
2 are random permutation
matrices.
For any individual server, say Serv(2), and any random permutation matrices S1, S2, we show that
there exist corresponding choices of S′1, S
′
2 such that the answers of Serv
(2) remain the same in both
tables in Figure 1. Specifically, set S′1 = (s1,1, s1,3, s1,2), S
′
2 = (s2,1, s2,3, s2,2), where si,j denotes the
jth column of Si for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2, 3. Then (a1,b1, a3 + b2) = (a
′
1,b
′
1, a
′
2 + b
′
3), which implies
that the query sequence for retrieving W1 has the same distribution as the query sequence for retrieving
W2 for the server Serv
(2). Similarly, one can find the corresponding permutation matrices S′1, S
′
2 for any
individual server. Since the permutation matrices are randomly chosen and privately known by the user,
the privacy condition is satisfied.
The total number of downloaded symbols from all servers is 4 + 3 + 3 = 10 and each record consists
of 6 symbols. Hence, the PIR rate is 610 =
3
5 , which matches the capacity for this case. To compute the
access number, one first notes that gτj ai = g
τ
jW1s1,i where g
τ
jW1 is the partial data stored in Serv
(j) and
s1,i is a binary vector of weight 1, and so providing g
τ
j ai requires accessing only one sub-packet stored in
Serv(j). Consequently, the access number of the tables in Figure 1 is exactly the number of gτj ai,g
τ
jbi’s
involved in the tables, which is 12 and attains the lower bound of the access number.
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Example 2. SupposeM=3, N=3,K=2. Then the sub-packetization of our scheme is L=KnM−1=18,
and so the records are denoted byW1,W2,W3 ∈ F2×9q . Similar to the Example 1, the data g
τ
i (W1, ...,WM )
is stored in the Serv(i) for all i ∈ [3], where gi is the ith column of G ∈ F2×3q , which is a generator matrix
of an [3, 2] MDS storage code. WLOG, suppose the desired record is W1.
First, define a[1:9] = W1S1, b[1:9] = W2S2, c[1:9] = W3S3, where S1, S2, S3 are privately chosen by
the user independently and uniformly from all 9 × 9 permutation matrices. The user then iteratively
applies Step (a1) and (a2) to generate the queries for all servers, which is displayed in Figure 2. For
simplicity, from now on we use the notation ai to denote g
τ
j ai if it appears in Serv
(j)’s answers. The
same simplification on notations are induced for bi’s and ci’s.
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
a1,a2 a1,a3, a4 a2, a3,a4
b1,b2 b1,b3,b4 b2,b3,b4
c1, c2 c1, c3, c4 c2, c3, c4
a5 + b3 a5 + b2
a6 + b4 a6 + b1
a7 + c3 a7 + c2
a8 + c4 a8 + c1
b5 + c5 b5 + c5
b6 + c6 b6 + c6
a9 + b6 + c6 a9 + b5 + c5
(a2)
(a1)
(a2)
(a1)
Figure 2 Query sequence for θ = 1 in the (M = 3, N = 3, K = 2) PIR scheme.
The correctness condition and the privacy condition can be similarly verified as in Example 1. The
access number of this scheme is 54, and the PIR rate of this scheme is 1838 =
9
19 , respectively, which
achieves the lower bounds for this case.
Example 3. Suppose M = 2, N = 5 and K = 2. Then the sub-packetization is L = KnM−1 = 10,
and so each record is regarded as a 2 × 5 matrix over Fq, i.e., W1,W2 ∈ F
2×5
q . Let gi for i ∈ [5] be the
ith column of a matrix G ∈ F2×5q , which is a generator matrix of an [5, 2] MDS code used for distributed
storage. Then the data stored in Serv(i) is gτi (W1,W2). WLOG, assume the desired record is W1.
Let S1, S2 be two binary matrices privately chosen by the user independently and uniformly from all
5 × 5 permutation matrices. Then define a[1:5] = W1S1, b[1:5] = W2S2. Then the queries to all servers
are displayed in Figure 3.
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3) Serv(4) Serv(5)
a1, a2 a1,a2
b1,b2 b1,b2
a3 + b1 a3 + b1 a4 + b1
a4 + b2 a5 + b2 a5 + b2
(a2)
(a1)
Figure 3 Query sequence for the θ = 1 in the (M = 2, N = 5, K = 2) PIR scheme.
The correctness condition and the privacy condition can be similarly verified as in Example 1. The
access number of this scheme is 20, and the PIR rate of this scheme is 1014 =
5
7 , respectively, which attains
the lower bounds for this case.
5.2 Formal description of the general scheme
In addition to the notations defined in Section II, a formal description of our general scheme requires
some additional notations that are listed in Table 1 for a quick check. As in the examples, the user
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first privately selects binary matrices S1, ..., SM independently and uniformly from all L˜ × L˜ binary
permutation matrices. Define Ui = WiSi = (ui,1, ...,ui,L˜), 1 6 i 6 M , where ui,j , 1 6 j 6 L˜ is a K-
dimensional column vector. For any subset Λ ⊆ [M ], we call qΛ,λ =
∑
i∈Λ ui,iλ a Λ-type |Λ|-sum, where
λ ∈ N, iλ ∈ [L˜]. Evidently, qΛ,λ is a desired column for Λ = {θ}, an interference column for θ /∈ Λ, and a
mixed column for {θ} ( Λ.
Table 1 Notations in the General Scheme
θ the index of the desired record
Λ Λ ∪ {θ} for some Λ ⊆ [M ]− {θ}
Λj,h suppose {Λ ⊆ [M ]− {θ} | |Λ| = j} = {Λj,1,Λj,2, ...,Λj,t} where 1 6 h 6 t =
(
M−1
j
)
qΛ,λ a Λ-type |Λ|-sum
q
(i)
Λ,h the hth Λ-type |Λ|-sum provided by Serv
(i)
γ
(i)
j the number of each type of j-sums provided by Serv
(i)
αj γ
(i)
j for 1 6 i 6 N −K
βj γ
(i)
j for N −K + 1 6 i 6 N
As illustrated in Example 1, the answers given by each server are generated as sums of the three kinds
of columns. Because of the record symmetry enforced by applying (a2) throughout the scheme, for any
Serv(i), i ∈ [N ] and all 1 6 j 6 M , each type of j-sums appears for the same number of times, that is,
for any Λ ⊆ [M ] with |Λ| = j, the number of Λ-type sums provided by Serv(i) only depends on i and
j. We denote this number by γ
(i)
j . For example, in Example 2 we have γ
(1)
1 = γ
(1)
2 = 2, γ
(1)
3 = 0 and
γ
(i)
1 = 3, γ
(i)
2 = γ
(i)
3 = 1 for i = 2, 3.
The key idea in minimizing the sub-packetization in this work is that we abandon the symmetry across
all servers enforced in [1] and instead adapt partial symmetry among the servers. Specifically, we divide
the N servers into two groups, the first N −K servers in one group and the remaining N −K servers in
the other. We then only enforce the symmetry across the servers within each group. Consequently, we
further define notations αj and βj such that αj , γ
(i)
j for 1 6 i 6 N−K, and βj , γ
(i)
j for N−K < i 6 N .
Therefore, a general description of the query sequences can be displayed in Table 2, where q
(i)
Λ,h is the hth
Λ- type |Λ|-sum provided the Serv(i).
Table 2
Λ-type Serv(i), 1 6 i 6 N −K Serv(i), N −K < i 6 N
∀Λ ⊆ [M ]
q
(i)
Λ,1
..
.
q
(i)
Λ,α|Λ|
q
(i)
Λ,1
...
q
(i)
Λ,β|Λ|
For simplicity, we denote Λ = Λ∪{θ} for any subset Λ ⊆ [M ]−{θ} and arrange all the types Λ ⊆ [M ]
in the following order: (
Λj,1, · · · , Λj,rj , · · · , Λj,1 · · · Λj,rj
)
06j<M
(28)
where rj =
(
M−1
j
)
and {Λj,1, ...,Λj,rj} = {Λ ⊆ [M ] − {θ} | |Λ| = j}. Evidently, r0 = 1 and Λ0,1 = ∅.
Moreover, for 0 6 j 6 M−1 and h ∈ [rj ], there are γ
(i)
j Λj,h-type j-sums and γ
(i)
j+1 Λj,h-type (j+1)-sums
downloaded from Serv(i). To specifically explain how these sums are formed, we first define two functions
Dist1(Λ,Λ) and Dist2(Λ,Γ).
(1) The function Dist1(Λ,Λ) for all Λ ⊆ [M ]− {θ} generates the Λ-type parts in all Λ-type sums. Its
operation follows the following rules:
(b1) The Λ-type parts all come from the Λ-type sums provided by the servers.
(b2) For each Serv(i), i ∈ [N ], its Λ-type sums and the Λ-type parts in all its Λ-types sums are distinct.
For example, in Example 2 where θ = 1, let Λ = {2}, then the result of Dist1({2}, {1, 2}) is displayed
in the left table in Figure 4. One can observe that b3,b4 are exactly the {2}-type parts of Serv
(1)’s
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{1, 2}-types sums because it provides the {1, 2}-types sums a5 + b3, a6 + b4 as shown in Figure 2. In
addition, one can verify that Dist1({2}, {1, 2}) satisfies the rule (b1) and (b2).
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
b3
b4
b2 b1
Dist1({2}, {1, 2})
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
a5
a6
a5 a6
Dist2({1}, {1, 2})
Serv(1) Serv(2) Serv(3)
b5 + c5
b6 + c6
b5 + c5 b6 + c6
Dist2({2, 3}, {2, 3})
Figure 4 Explanations of the functions Dist1(Λ,Λ) and Dist2(Λ,Γ) in Example 2.
(2) The function Dist2(Λ,Γ) generates the Λ-type parts in all Γ-type sums, where Λ = Γ ⊆ [M ]− {θ}
or Λ = {θ} ⊆ Γ ⊆ [M ]. Its operation follows the following rules:
(b3) For any i ∈ [N ], Serv(i) gets γ
(i)
|Γ| Λ-type parts each of which is allocated to a Γ-type sums.
(b4) Each Λ-type part appears in K different servers.
For example, for the case θ = 1 in the Example 2, the results of Dist2({1}, {1, 2}) and Dist2({2, 3}, {2, 3})
are displayed in the middle table and the right table in Figure 4, respectively. By repeatedly invoking
the functions Dist1(·, ·) and Dist2(·, ·), the Algorithm 1 generates all queries to each server.
Algorithm 1
Require: θ
Ensure: (Q
(1)
θ , ..., Q
(N)
θ )
1: Initialize : (Q
(1)
θ , ..., Q
(N)
θ )← ∅
2: for j = 0 :M − 1 do
3: for h = 1 : rj do
4: (Q
(1)
Λj,h
, ..., Q
(N)
Λj,h
)← Dist2(Λj,h,Λj,h),
5: (Q
(1)
Λj,h
, ..., Q
(N)
Λj,h
)← Dist1(Λj,h,Λj,h) + Dist2(θ,Λj,h)
6: for i = 1 : N do
7: Q
(i)
θ ← Q
(i)
θ ∪ {Q
(i)
Λj,h
, Q
(i)
Λj,h
}
8: end for
9: end for
10: end for
Now let us discuss the way of realizing the functions Dist1(·, ·) and Dist2(·, ·). Note that for the function
Dist2(·, ·), a necessary condition of the requirement (b3), (b4) is
K|(N −K)αj +Kβj for 1 6 j 6 M. (29)
Moreover, for the function Dist1(·, ·), a necessary condition of the requirement (b1), (b2) is

αj+1 + αj =
(N−K)αj+Kβj
K
,
βj+1 + βj =
(N−K)αj+Kβj
K
,
αj , βj ∈ N, j ∈ [M ].
(30)
Assume that we have determined the values of αj and βj such that (29) and (30) are satisfied. Then,
the function Dist1(Λ,Λ) can be realized as follows. Suppose |Λ| = j. Denote QΛ as the set of all Λ-
type j-sums contained in all servers. QΛ is actually the output of the function Dist2(Λ,Λ). Therefore,
|QΛ| =
∑
N
i=1 γ
(i)
j
K
=
(N−K)αj+Kβj
K
. Let Q
(i)
Λ , i ∈ [N ] be the set of Λ-type j-sums contained in the server
Serv(i), i.e., that is the i-th tuple of Dist2(Λ,Λ). Then, |Q
(i)
Λ | = αj for 1 6 i 6 N −K and |Q
(i)
Λ | = βj for
N −K + 1 6 i 6 N . By the identity (30), the i-th tuple of Dist1(Λ,Λ) is QΛ −Q
(i)
Λ for 1 6 i 6 N .
The key point in realizing the function Dist2(Λ,Γ) is to ensure symmetry across the servers within
each group and to simultaneously satisfy the rule (b4). Note that for the last K servers, the requirement
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(b4) and symmetry of servers can be easily satisfied, and therefore we only need to consider the first
N −K tuples of Dist2(Λ,Γ). However, when N −K < K, the first N −K tuples of Dist2(Λ,Γ) cannot
locally satisfy (b4) in the group, and so it needs help from the last K tuples. Therefore, we realize the
function Dist2(Λ,Γ) for the case N − K > K and N − K < K separately. We first define an index
function IniCol(Λ,Γ) = (ℓj(Λ,Γ))j∈Λ, which returns the initial index of the columns used in the function
Dist2(Λ,Γ) when it is invoked in the Algorithm 1. Hence, IniCol(∅, ∅) = 0 and IniCol({j}, {j}) = 1 for
j ∈ [M ]. Moreover for 1 < ν < M, 1 6 h 6 rν ,
ℓj(Λν,h,Λν,h) =
ν−1∑
s=1
rs∑
t=1
χΛs,t(j)
(N −K)αs +Kβs
K
+
h−1∑
t=1
χΛs,t(j)
(N −K)αν +Kβν
K
+ χΛν,h(j),
ℓθ({θ},Λν,h) =
ν−1∑
s=0
rs
(N −K)αs+1 +Kβs+1
K
+ (h− 1)
(N −K)αν+1 +Kβν+1
K
+ 1,
(31)
where j ∈ [M ] − {θ} and χΛ(·) is the characteristic function of the set Λ, i.e., χΛ(a) = 1 if a ∈ Λ and
χΛ(a) = 0 if a /∈ Λ. For example, for the case θ = 1 in the Example 2, IniCol({2, 3}, {2, 3}) = (5, 5) and
IniCol({1}, {1, 2}) = 5. Denote qΛ,h =
∑
j∈Λ uℓj+h−1, where (ℓj)j∈Λ = IniCol(Λ,Γ).
(1) Dist2(Λ,Γ) for the case N > 2K
Let t = N−K
K
α|Γ|. The first step of Dist2(Λ,Γ) is generating the first N−K tuples, that is, arrange the
t Λ-type sums qΛ,1,qΛ,2, ...,qΛ,t to the first N −K servers according to the rules (b3),(b4), as displayed
in Table 3. Therefore, for the server Serv(i), 1 6 i 6 N − K, the h-th component of the i-th tuple of
Table 3
N−K︷ ︸︸ ︷
Serv(1)Serv(2) · · · · · · Serv(N−K) Serv(1) · · ·
qΛ,1 qΛ,1 · · · qΛ,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
qΛ,2 qΛ,2 · · · qΛ,2︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
· · ·
Dist2(Λ,Γ) is qΛ,⌈ (h−1)(N−K)+i
K
⌉
for 1 6 h 6 α|Γ|.
The second step of Dist2(Λ,Γ) is generating the last K tuples such that (b3) and (b4) are satisfied.
The generating process is the same as that of the first step. Note that there are exactly K servers, then
each tuple is qt+1,qt+2, ...,qt+β|Γ| .
(2) Dist2(Λ,Γ) for the case N < 2K
Dist2(Λ,Γ) generates the first N − K tuples, each of which has the form qΛ,1,qΛ,2, ...,qΛ,α|Γ| . Note
that each Λ-type sum qΛ,h does not satisfy the requirement (b4), because it only appears in N−K servers
at present. We must then use K− (N −K) = 2K−N out of the last K servers to provide the additional
copies of these Λ-type sums. Therefore, we symmetrically allocate the Λ-type sums qΛ,1,qΛ,2, ...,qΛ,α|Γ|
to the last K servers such that each Λ-type sum appears in 2K − N servers. Note that K > 2K − N
and K|(2K −N)α|Γ| from (29). Similarly, as the map displayed in the Table 3, we can realize such an
arrangement and each of the last K servers provide 2K−N
K
α|Γ| Λ-type sums. Finally, to satisfy the rule
(b3), we need to send another γ|Γ| , β|Γ| −
2K−N
K
α|Γ| Λ-type sums to each of the last K tuples. Note
that γ|Γ| > 0 from (30).
5.3 Parameters in the scheme
In this section, we determine the values of αj , βj , 1 6 j 6 M such that (29) and (30) are satisfied.
Suppose d = gcd(N,K), n = N
d
, k = K
d
. From (29) and (30), we obtain the following equations,


βj+1 =
n−k
k
αj ,
αj+1 = βj +
n−2k
k
αj ,
k|(n− k)αM ,
αj , βj ∈ N, 1 6 j 6 M.
(32)
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From the recursive relations in (32), we obtain two geometric series, i.e.,{
(n− k)αj+1 + kβj+1 =
n−k
k
((n− k)αj + kβj),
αj+1 − βj+1 = −(αj − βj), 1 6 j < M.
(33)
By assigning proper values to (α1, β1) or (αM , βM ), we can obtain the integer solutions of (33) and in
turn get the solutions of (32). When N > 2K, set α1 = 0, β1 = k
M−1, we obtain the integer solutions{
αj =
(n−k)j−1−(−k)j−1
n
kM−j+1,
βj =
(n−k)j−2−(−k)j−2
n
(n− k)kM−j+1.
(34)
When N < 2K, set αM = 0, βM = (n− k)
M−1, we obtain the integer solutions{
αj =
kM−j−(k−n)M−j
n
k(n− k)j−1,
βj =
kM−j+1−(k−n)M−j+1
n
(n− k)j−1.
(35)
It is easy to verify that (34) and (35) provide the solution to (32) for the case N > 2K and for the case
K < N < 2K, respectively. In both cases, we can observe that
(N −K)αj +Kβj
K
= (n− k)j−1kM−j . (36)
We then calculate the parameter L˜. For the desired record Wθ, one can observe from (31) that
L˜ > ℓθ({θ}, [M ])− 1 +
(N −K)αM +KβM
K
= nM−1. (37)
However, for each undesired record Uj , j ∈ [M ]− {θ}, it has
L˜ > ℓj([M ]− {θ}, [M ]− {θ})− 1 +
(N −K)αM−1 +KβM−1
K
= knM−2. (38)
Therefore, it is sufficient to set L˜ = max{nM−1, knM−2} = nM−1, and thus the sub-packetization L =
KL˜ = KnM−1 in our scheme. Note that in (37) and (38) we respectively calculate the number of columns
from the desired record and from each undesired record invoked by all N servers, and it turns out that
the former is larger than the latter. However, for each individual server, the number of columns from
each record are invoked because of the record symmetry within each server. Finally, we calculate the
access number of our scheme, which is
ω =
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
(
M
j
)
jγ
(i)
j =MK
M∑
j=1
(
M − 1
j − 1
)
(
N −K
K
αj + βj) =MKn
M−1. (39)
5.4 Properties of the scheme
Because the sub-packetization and the access number has been calculated in the last section for simulta-
neously attaining the lower bounds, we must still verify that the scheme described in Section 5.2 satisfies
the correctness and the privacy condition and achieves the capacity.
The correctness condition can be easily verified based on the rules (b1), (b4), and the [N,K] MDS
code which is used in distributed storage system. The privacy condition is derived from the rules (b2)
and (b3), which implies that for each individual server, the same number of columns from each record
are invoked in a symmetric form and each column is invoked at most one time.
Finally, from Table 2, we can compute the download size, i.e.,
D =
M∑
j=1
(
M
j
)
((N −K)αj +Kβj)
(a)
= K
M−1∑
j=0
(
M
j
)
(n− k)j−1kM−j = K
nM − kM
n− k
,
where (a) comes from the identity (36). One can immediately check that the rate of our scheme achieves
the capacity for coded PIR.
Corollary 1. ForM > 2 and 1 6 K < N , the optimal sub-packetization and the optimal access number
for linear capacity-achieving coded PIR schemes from MDS coded non-colluding servers are KnM−1 and
MKnM−1 respectively, where d = gcd(N,K) and n = N/d.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the problem of minimizing the sub-packetization and the access number
for all linear capacity-achieving PIR schemes from [N,K] MDS coded non-colluding servers. The optimal
sub-packetization and the optimal access number are explicitly determined for all nontrivial cases. The
process of proving the lower bound on the sub-packetization is an extension of the proof of [24] from
replicated PIR to coded PIR, and the main design idea for reducing the sub-packetization by using
partial symmetry among servers is the same as that used in [24]. However, some extra proof skills
and design rules are specially developed for coded PIR, such as the function Vec introduced in Section
3.2 and the design rule (b4) in Section 5.2. In addition, our approach for characterizing the minimum
sub-packetization and the minimum access number can be extended to other PIR models.
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